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Investment  decisions  in developing  countries  face some  addi-
tional constraints  than in industrial  countries. Analysts  must
consider  such  additional  factors  as  financial  repression,  shortage
of foreign exchange, lack of infrastructure,  and significant
economic  instability. Rama suggests  a method  for improving
empirical  investment  equations  in developing  countres.
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Since  the debt  crisis, there has been increasing  careful  introduction  into  the theoretical  models
interest  in the determinants  of investment  in  from which  investment  equation  are  drawn
developing  countries. There is plentiful  litera-  deserves  further  research. This is particularly
ture on the topic for industrial  economies  but  true for the intertemporal  aspects  of analysis,
existing  studies  on developing  countries  are  restrained  in Rama's analysis  to a simple  two-
scattered  and few.  period  framework.
Rama examined'those  studies  with an eye  to  Wifth  a few exceptions  the 'available  empiri-
answering  two questions: Are the variables  that  cal studies are  not satisfactory,  Rama finds. The
influence  investment-decisions  the same  in  . endogenous  variable  is seldom  scated,  so it -
developing  as in industrial  countries,  or sjould  probably  gathers  a time trend. And some;key
other factors  be considered  because  the macro--  exogenous  variables  - such as'the  user cost of
economic  setting  is different? And what can be  capital,  the upper  bounds  on credit, and the
learned  from the applied  research  that has been  availability  of foreign  exchange  - are  measured
done on the subject?  in misleading  ways. The measurement  issue
deserves  more research.
After revisiting  the theoretical  debate,  Rama
presents  an integrative  analytical  framework,  Rama stresses  the importance  of the aggre-
including  different  empirical  equations,  that  gation  procedure  when  there is significant
depend  on the assumptions  made about  the  economic  instability. Sudden  and dramatic
economies'  key features  (such as market struc-  policy  changes  modify  the relevant  investment
ture and credit rationing). He classifies  25  rule. By raising  or reducing  the share  of firms
empirical  studies  on investments  in developing  that face credit or fureign  exchange  rationing,
countries,  classifying  them according  to their  these  changes  prevent  use of a representative-
chosen specification  and comparing  their  esti-  firm  approach.
mates.
Finaly, Rama  proposes  a method  for dealing
Rama  concludes  that investment  decisions  in  with the effects  on private investment  of the
developing  countries  are not necessarily  based  economic  instability  typical in most developing
on the same  variables  as in industrial  countries.  countries.
Analysts  must consider  such additional  factors  as
financial  repression,  shortage  of foreign  ex-  Applied  research  would  help decide whether
change,  lack of infrastructure,  and significant  the suggested  procedure  improves  the economet-
economic  instability.  ric performance  of empirical  investment  equa-
tions in developing  countries.
In general,  the available  empirical  studies
support  these  arguments  somewhat,  so their
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Since  the  debt  crisis,  there  has  been  an  increasing  interest
in  the  determinants  of  private  investment  in  less  developed
countries  (LDCs).  For  industrialized  countries,  there  is
plentiful  literature  on  this  topic,  referring  to  the  available
theoretical  models  (see  the  surveys  by  Nickell,  1978,  or  Artus
and  {luet,  1786),  as  well  as  to  the  empirical  results  obtained
when  using  different  specifications  (see  Abel  1980,  or  Artus  and
Muet,  1984,  among  others).  But  with  relation  to  LDCs,  the
existing  studies  are  still  partial  and  scattered.
Two  main  questions  should  be  addressed  concerning  private
investment  decisions  in LDCs.  The  first  one,  theoretical,
concerns  the  variables  on  which  the  decisions  depend:  are  they
the  same  as  in  industrialized  countries,  or  should  we  consider
specific  factors,  arising  from  a  different  macroeconomic  setting?
The  second  question  has  an  empirical  content,  related  to  the
available  estimates:  what  can  we  learn  from  the  applied  research
that  has  already  been  done  on  the  determinants  of  private
investment  in LDCs?
This  paper  seeks  to  provide  a preliminary  answer  to  both
queF.tions.  In  the  next  section,  the  theoretical  debate  on  the
specific  factors  that  should  be  taken  into  account  in  LDCs  is
revisited.  Section  3  introduces  the  mair, outcomes  of  such  a
debate  into  a  single  analytical  framework,  which  gives  rise  to
different  empirical  equations  depending  on  the  assumptions  made
concerning  some  key  features  of  the  economy  (market  structures,
credit  rationing,  etc.).  In  the  following  section,  twenty-five
empirical  studies  on  investment  in LDCs  are  classified  according
to  their  chosen  specification,  and  their  estimates  are  compared.
Finally,  section  5  gathers  a methodological  proposal  for  further
research,  particularly  as  regards  the  impact  that  the  economic
instability  characterizing  most  LDC.s has  on  private  investment.2
2.  SOME  SPECIFIC  ISSUES
The.  literature  on  investment  decisions  in  industrialized
countries  stands  basically  on  two  arguments.  The  first  one  is
related  to changes  in aggregate  demand  and  gives  rise  to  the
"income  accelerator".  The  second  one  concerns  relative  prices  of
capital  and  labor  (or  more  generally,  variable  inputs),  and
therefore  profitability.  These  arguments  are  both  considered  by
the  literature  on  private  investment  in  LDCs.  However,  four
other  arguments  are  usually  added,  which  arise  from  specific
features  of  these  countries.
Financial  repression
Since  the  works  by Mc  Kinnon  (1973)  and  Shaw  (1973),  it  has
been  widely  accepted  that  a significant  share  of  LDCs'  firms  face
credit  rationing.  This  kind  of  quantity  constraint  may  be
relevant  in  industrialized  countries  also,  as  a  result  of  the
different  information  available  to  creditors  and  debtors.
However,  in  addition  to  the  information  problem,  LDCs  are  often
characterized  by  administered  interest  rates  which  are  set  up  at
"low"  levels,  and  by direct  credit  allocation  for  the  benefit  of
some  firms.  The  impact  of  such  a policy  choice  on  private
investment  is  amrlified  by  the  weakness  of  capital  markets  in
LDCs.  which  restrains  the  access  of  the  firms  to  additional
equity  capital.
According  to  this  approach,  ceilingE  are  more  relevant  than
spreads  for  credit  allocation  in  LDCs.  This  means  that  the
individual  firm  does  not  face  unlimited  credit  supplies  at  a
given  interest  rate.  as  would  be  the  case  in  a Modigliani-Miller3
world.  Moreover,  unlimited  credit  supplies  with  interest  rates
increasing  in  line  with  the  firm's  debt-to-equity  ratio  do  not
seem  likely  either.  Instead,  the  firm  would  have  access  (at
most)  to  a gi.'en credit  ceiling,  but  the  interest  rate  would
always  be  the  administered  one,  whatever  the  amount  borrowed.'
At  the  macroeconomic  level,  this  possible  constraint  on  the
investment  level  had  been  already  considered  by  the  two-gap
model,  developed  in  the  '60s  by  Mc  Kinnon  (1964)  and  Chenery  and
Strout  (1966),  among  others.  This  model  assumed  that  domestic
savings,  the  world  demand  for  exports,  and  foreign  financing  were
given.  The  sum  of  domestic  savings  and  foreign  financing  put  an
upper  bound  on  total  investmnent  (thus  giving  rise  to  a saving
gap),  whereas  the  sum  of  exports  and  foreign  financing  set  up  the
maximum  imports  level  (leading  to  a  foreign  exchange  gap).  Since
the  first  of  these  two  gaps  is  related  to  interest  rates  which  do
not  clear  the  market,  its  effects  are  quite  similar  to  those
arising  from  credit  rationing.
Financial  repression  has  an  important  consequence  from  the
research  viewpoint.  Despite  the  existence  of  an  investment
functiors,  in  some  periods  the  observed  capital  accumulation  coLId
be  determined  by  the  amount  of  saving  forthcoming  at  the
prevailing  interest  rate.  Therefore,  the  microeconomic
foundations  of  investment  decisions  should  be  analyzed  by  means
of  an  equilibrium-with-rationing  approach,  like  the  one  that
characterizes  fix-price  models  (see  Malinvaud,  1977).z
1/  However,  if  there  was  a  spillover  of  the  credit  demand  to
curb  markets,  the  average  interest  rate  would  indeed  rise  in
line  with  the  amount  borrowed  bv  the  firm.
2/  Other  disequilibria  considered  by  these  models  do  not  seem
relevant  to explain  private  investment  in  1.,Cs.  This  is  the
case,  particularly,  with  manpower  shortage,.4
Foreign  exchange  shortage
Since  m-,ost  capital  goods  must  be  im.ported  by LDCs,  the  kind
of  foreig-, exechange  shortage  considered  by  the  two-gap  model  can
br  an  additional  constraint  on  private  investment.  This  would  be
the  case  if  balance-of-payfmient  difficulties  kassociated,  for
instance,  with  the  debt  crisis)  led  to  the  use  of  direct  exchange
allocation  or  to  the  setting  up  of  import  quotas.  Such  policy
devices  would  introduce  an  upper  bound  on  machinery  and  equipment
purchases  which  are  usualy  made  abroad,  and  cannot  be  easil
replaced  by  domestic  substitutes.-
The  discussion  on  the  determinants  of  private  investment  in
LDCs  would  not  be  complete  if  such  a  possible  constraint  were  not
explicitly  taken  into  account.  From  the  point  of  vier,  of
empirical  rL-search,  its  consequences  are  similar  to  those  of
credit  rationing.  In  both  cases,  the  in-vestment  equation  to  be
used  must  arise  fromt an  optimization  problem  explicitly  including
the  possibility  of  quantity  rationing.
Lack  of  infrastructure
It is  usually  accepted  that  private  investment  can  fall  as  a
result  of  a  higher  public  investment  when  the  latter  rests  on
scarce  financial  resource-.  In  industrialized  countries,  this
crowding-out  effect  is  induced  by  higher  interest  rates.  In LDCs
in  which  financial  repression  prevails,  it can  arise  from  a  tight
credit  rationirg  at  the  prevailing  administered  interest  rate.
However,  public  investment  could  also  impose  a positive
externality  on  private  investment  in countries  characterized  by
3/  However,  notice  that  in  many  LDCs  such  devices  aim  at
restraining  su.nptuary  consumption  purchases,  rather  than
input  and  investment  imports.lack  of  infrastructure,  or  by weakness--s  in  the  provision  of
public  goods.  In this  case,  public  capital  accumulation  would  be
complementary  to  private  investment.
This  ambiguous  relationship  between  public  and  private
investment  represents  a challenge  to  applied  research.  On  the
one  hand,  empirical  estimates  should  provide  an  answer  on  whether
or  not  the  lack  of  infrastructure  is  important  enough  to give
rise  to a  significant  externality.  On  the  other  hand,  these
estimates  should  help  to  decide  whether  the  crowding-out  effect
dominates  the  positive  externality  or  the  opposite.
Economic  instability
Some  of  the  variables  relevant  for  investment  decisions
experience  larger  fluctuations  in  LDCs  than  in  industrialized
countries.  This  is  partly  due  to  a  different  economic  structure,
particularly  as  regards  secto:al  diversification.  For  inL__nce,
there  may  be  important  vae-iations  of  the  real  exchange  rate  in
countries  whose  exports  are  concentrated  in a  few  raw  materials
or  agricultural  products.  Notwithstanding,  a  large  share  of  the
instability  which  characterizes  most  LDCs  results  from  political
and  institutional  factors.  In  fact,  the  larger  changes  in  the
real  exchange  rate  often  result  from  policy-induced  over-  or
under-valuation  of  the  domestic  currency.  The  same  holds  for
credit  availability,  aggregate  demand,  and  other  variables  whose
level  depends  on  sudden  (and  sometimes  dramatic)  changes  in
economic  policy.
If firm  owners  were  risk  averse,  lower  investment  levels
would  result  from  such  an  instability,  because  of  the  larger
variance  in expected  profits.  The  result  would  be  similar  if
investment  were  irreversible  (at  least  partly),  thus  giving  rise
to  sunk  costs  whenever  capacity  utilization  fell  (Bertola,  1987;6
Pindyck,  1988).  But even  if firm owners  were  risk neutral  and
capital  goods  could  be resold,  there  would  be important
consequences  for empirical  research.  Dramatic  economic  policy
changes  (such as the adoption  of adjustment  programs)  put  forward
the Lucas  critique.  So,  different  specifications  should  be used
for the  investment  function,  depending  on  the prevailing
macroeconomic  conditions.
3.  AN  INTEGRATIVE  FRAMEWORK
Three  of  the  specific  issues  discussed  above,  namely:
financial  repression,  foreign  exchange  shortage  and  lack of
infrastructure,  can  be introduced  in a rigorous  manner  into  the
investment  equations  usually  considered  for empirical  research.
This  is  done  here  by  means  of  a  single  analytical  model,  from
which  different  specifications  can  be  drawn.  As  regards  economic
instability,  which  was  the  fourth  issue,  its  consequences  on  the
specification  of  empirical  investment  equations  are  discussed  in
section  5.
Objective  function  and  constraints
Consider  the  investment  decisions  of  a single  representa  ive
firm  which  seeks  to  maximize  the  sum  of  its  discounted  dividends
or,  tantamount,  the  increase  of  its  market  value  AV,  over  a
finite  horizon.  This  dynamic  feature  of  the  investment  decision
can  be  taken  into  account  by  considering  just  two  periods:
"present"  (t)  and  "future"  (t+1):
AV  =  (pe.O*e  - w%.Le)  +  Cve.KPt  - ve-X.(l  +  rf_-).KPe-xJ7
r  2
- VVt.p.  (UPt  +  -. u?)
2
+  .(p.QX.-a.  Wi.-L.Lt--f) +
I +  rI  l +  rt
In this  equation,  Q  stands  for  total  output,  KP  for  the  capital
stock  and  L  for  the  employment  level,  whereas  p,  v and  w
represent  the  corresponding  nominal  prices  and  wages.  Besides,  r
is  the  discount  rate,  which  will  be  treated  as  given. 4
The  first  term  in  the  right-hand  side  of  the  equation
represents  current  profits  in  period  t.  The  second  one  measures
capital  gains  or  losses  during  the  first  period,  which  arise  from
changes  in  the  market  price  of  the  firm's  machinery  and
equipment.  Since  none  of  these  two  terms  depend  on  the
investment  level,  they  are  hereafter  replaced  by  Z, and  treated
as  given.  The  third  term  is a  convex  function  of  the  investment
rate  ue,  which  is  the  ratio  between  gross  investment  IPe  and  the
already  ex.isting  capital  stock  KP,.  The  whole  third  term  is
equal  to  (larger  than)  IP.t  when  the  parai.ster  r  is null  (strictly
positive).'  The  fourth  term  stands  for  the  discounted  value  of
future  current  profits,  whereas  the  last  or.e  corresponds  to
capital  r7ains or  losses  in  the  second  period.
The  firm's  optimization  problem  includes  a  set  of
technological  and  economic  constraints.  Among  the  former  is  the
motion  law  of  the  capital  stock,  which  depends  on  the  investment
level  and  the  depreciation  rate  6:
4/  Steigum  (1983)  and  Chirinko  (1987)  analyze  the  case  in which
the  interest  rate  r  (and  therefore,  investment  decisions
themselves)  depends  on  the  debt-to-equity  ratio  of  the  firm.
5/  Notice  that  the  capital  price  vt  is  the  same  in  this  term  as
in  the  previous  one.  thus  reflecting  the  assumption  that
capital  goods  can  be  resold.KP,=  +  IP.  1  +  Ue
K,PfWt  - - KP..  ,  <  6  '  1  (1)
1+  1  +6
The  production  function  is  the  second  technological
constraint  on  investment  decisions.  We  assume,  for  simplicity:
f  a 
Q=_A.  =  f  (K.G=*  <P  ,L,L  1)  =  KG  s  K.  ;P=_..  Lft.-.  (2)
T~~~~ >I  a¢  <  <  I 
In  equation  (2),  KG  represents  the  public  sector's  capital  stock,
and  measures  the  development  reached  by  the  country's
infrastructure.  A  larger  KG  imposes  a  positive  externality  on
private  production  whenever  T  >  0.  For  T  =  0,  on  the  contrary,
eqluation  (2)  is  just  a  standard  Cobb-Douglas  production  function.
Note  further  that  1  =  0 corresponds  to  the  fixed  coefficients
case,  with  private  capital  stock  as  the  scarce  production
f  actor  .^
Economic  constraints  arise  from  the  structure  of  the  markets
in  which  the  firm  operates.  Concerning  the  firm's  output,  a
quite  general  specification  is  obtained  by  assuming  the  following
demand  curve:
pt-s±  -g
Ge  s=  Y  §  /  )  - )  ( 3)
6/  A  third  technological  constraint  would  be  lP%  _  0.  However,
throughout  the  paper  it  will  be  assumed  that  determinants  of
investment  are  such  as  to  avoid  the  corner  solution  IPt  =  0.9
In equation  (!).,  Y represents  real  aggregate  demand,  J  is  the
number  of  firms  in  the  whole  economy,  and  P  (uppercase)  the
general  pr-ice inder.  Therefore,  p!P  is  the  relative  price  of  the
firm  s  output.7
Depending  on  the  value  of  ca,  different  market  structures  are
obtained.  The  firm  operates  in  monopolistic  competition  when
a  >  1,  in which  case  pt.  is  onie of  its  control  variables.
Besides,  it  operates  in  a perfectly  competitive  market  when  a
+w,  .- ahereds it  faces  a  sales  constraint  like  those  considered  by
fix-price  models  when  ci  ' -I.  In thise  two  cases,  the  price  is
given  at  the  level  p_  =  P±.x  so  that  it  does  not  represent  a
control  variable  of  the  firm  anymore.
Concerning  the  otner  markets,  the  discussion  in  section  2
points  out  that  credit  and  foreign  exchange  shortages  are  likely
in  LPCs.  1f  the  firm  is  unable  to  borrow  beyond  a certain  limit,
investment  expenditures  are  bounded  by:
r  2
vf.KP*.(  u%  e,  -,ut  )  P,.F,  (4)
where  F  represents  the  sum  (measured  in  real  terms)  of  internal
financing,  net  credit  and  additional  equity-capital  available  for
the  firm  (P  is  the  general  price  index  defined  above).
The  second  possible  quantity  constraint  is  related  to  the
use  of  direct  foreign  exchange  allocation  as  a device  to  reduce
the  purchases  made  abroad.  Assuming  that  a given  share  4  of
total  investment  must  be  imported,  the  rationing  scheme  implies:
x,=  .A
.IPt  O  <  I  <  1 
Vft
7/  A  micro-foundation  for  this  kind  of  demand  function  is
provided  by  Dixit  and  Stiglitz  (1977).10
with  A  representing  the  total  amount  of  foreign  currency
available  to  the  firm,  ar.d xt  being  the  corresponding  exchange
rate."  If quantity  restrictions  were  used  instead  nf
administered  foreign  exchange  allocation,  xftA/vt  would  directly
measure  the  allowed  import  quota.
Monopolistic  competition
Assume  that  monopolistic  competition  prevails  in  the  goods
market  (a  > 1)  and  that  there  are  no  investment  costs  (r  =  o).
Ey  replacing  equation  (1)  in AV,  the  firm's  objective  function
can  be  rewritten  as:
I
,V  =2  +  e  .(  Pe  t^s-Cv  4 X  KPe_-  - we  t  x.Le  ~.  )
1  +  rf
/  :s-  V  t
with:  Ct*-zX  vt.(6  +  rt  - )  7  since  S.r,  =  0
Here,  cet-. is  the  standard  analytical  expression  for  the  user
cost  of  capital,  i.e.  for  the  flow  price  for  capital  services.
Indeed,  the  term  S  is  the  depreciation  charge  per  unit  of
capital,  whereas  rt  - (v_t-. - vt)/vt  can  be  seen  as  a real
interest  rate  evaluated  with  respect  to  the  market  price  of
capital  goods.  The  cet-. variable  allows  to  transform  the
intertemporal  optimization  problem  into  a  traditional  static  one.
8/  Equation  (5)  is written  as  if  the  price  of  capital  goods
were  the  same  whatever  their  origin  (imported  or
domestically  produced).I 
The  firm  maximizes  V with  respect  to  its  future  price  pft.7.
and  its  future  capital  stock  KPft^.  Taking  irto  account
equatiorns  (2)  and  (3),  the  objective  function  becomes:
1  I-a  a
V  =  Z+-  .C  p±.((/J).P)-,  - ct.  KPt+
1  +  rt
j./;3 -(T!'f3  c'J3  -'a/6  -a/P
- we  . (  1 /'  )  .pt'.-P . P_*  J<Ge_  .I<KPe  )  3
The  first-order  condition  with  respect  to  p|1.. gives  rise  to
a standard  mark-up  equation  on  labor  costs:
cv  aJE)  (1-0)/C4  -X/e  -a/E)  wtl  0/
with  e  =  P+(-P)a.  The  mark-up  ratio  rises  in  line  with
aggregate  demand,  decreases  with  private  capital  stock  and
decreases  also  (for  a  >  0)  with  the  country's  infrastructure.
The  firm's  optimal  capital  stock  is  obtained  by  replacing
this  result  in  the  first-order  condition  associated  with  KP_-2.:
(.a+f3)+(I-ca-P)o  a  E)  ca-e  E  cv  (-l  ct.2  . -e  wft.- -(a-El)
KPe ,,  (-)  .(  -)  . (Ye  . 1JJ  ) .KG,,e,  e  (  )
a3  °  Pe  Pe+.~2
In order  that  KPf..l correspond  to  the  maximum  AV,  the  second-
order  condition  must  also  be  fulfilled.  Intuitively,  for  a >  I
it  is  necessary  to verify  a+R  <  al(u-1).  Otherwise,  the  exponent
of  KPt.. 2 in  the  equation  above  would  be negative,  so  that  the
optimal  capital  stock  would  increase  with  the  user  cost  of
capital,  decrease  with  aggregate  demand,  etc..12
The  optimal  investment  rule  under  monopolistic  competition
is  obtained  by  rewriting  the  equation  above  in growth  rates,
hereafter  indicated  by  a  hat.  Provided  that:
IP,
KP,e,  1  o4  - - &
KP,
(see  equation  (1))  and  replacing  e  by  its  analytical  expression:
a  =Pt  +  _+  0-+  05-(  L) +
KPt  P*  P  t,..
with:
1  'r(a-l)
OR1  =.  --  >>O  ,  0-  20
(ca+a3+(1-cA-f3)o  (a+f3)+(1-c*-13
13+(1-f3)cv  t3(u-1)
Omz  =  _  <  0  ,  0R4  =  - <  0
Equation  (6)  is  the  kind  of  analytical  expression  developed
for  industrialized  countries  by  Blanchard  (1988)  or,  in  a more
elaborate  framework,  by  Sneessens  (1987).  Its  main  interest  is
to  provide  a micro-foundation  for  the  arguments  usually
considered  when  dealing  with  data.  Indeed,  the  second  term  in
the  right-hand  side  of  equation  (6) can  be  seen  as  an  income
accelerator.  Concerning  the  last  two  terms.  they  capture  the
effects  of  changes  in  relative  factor  prices.
What  is  added  by  equation  (6)  is  the  effect  of  a  larger
infrastructure  on  private  investment  (second  term).  Thus,  the
equation  captures  one  of  the  arguments  of  the  literature  on13
investment  in LDCs  which  was  discussed  above.  Such  an  effect
arises  from  the  specification  of  the  production  function  and  is
embodied  in coefficient  0v,  which  is positive  whenever  T  >  0.
Finally,  notice  that  the  structural  parameters  a,  (,  T  and  a
can  be  drawn  from  the  0  coefficients  in equation  (6):
1  O".4
=3  =
e-l+e^-.+¢-*  ^ ~~~Orw+X-3:-+X-04
¢§ft2  giwe.t~~~,.s+0pR4
T = - w  a~~~~~C  = -
OFR  2  +Hf  +4Z  04  2.
Concerning  6,  no  additional  calculations  are  required.
The  "true"  neoclassical  case
From  equation  (6),  it  is  straightforward  to derive  the
optimal  investment  rule  under  perfect  competition.  In this  case,
the  firm  faces  an  infinitely  elastic  demand  curve  (a  ->  +X)  at  a
given  price  (p...x =  P_.x)t.  By  using  limits,  equation  (6)  yields:
- =  E  +  0-z  .KG  .-..2 +  Ofq3.(-)  +  ot,44.(')  (7)
KPP  ew  P
with:
Il-fl  3
Or-4=  0  ,  - 9  C)  9 
0
N4  =  --  90
1-ca-13  1-cI-13 14
The  restriction  required  on  the  production  function  parameters  in
order  to  fulfill  the  second-order  condition  is  now  a4R  < 1.
These  parameters  verify:
I  +0Ns 
0 N4
a =  ,  ~3 =  ,  =  _ .
0,'43  +zXb4  N0+0MN  0M  +OM4
Investment  rules  like  the  one  represented  by  equation  (7)
have  been  seldom  used  in  industrialized  countries  (an  exception
is  the  paper  by  Schramm,  1972).  One  possible  explanation  is  that
the  omission  of  an  income  accelerator  effect  leads  to
disappointing  empirical  results.  But  in  addition,  what  has  been
usually  identified  as  the  "neoclassical"  investment  function  is  a
specification  quite  different  from  equation  (7).
Effective  demand  (the  so-called  "neoclassical  model")
At  the  opposite  of  perfect  competition,  it could  be  assumed
that  the  firm  faces  quantity  rationing  in  the  goods  market.  This
is  likely  to occur  when  prices  are  set  by  the  government,  or  when
they  result  from  prior  contracts.  In  terms  of  equation  (3),
demand  is  fully  inelastic  with  respect  to  relative  prices  (a =  0)
so  that  sales  have  to  be  taken  as  given  at  the  level  (Y"-1 /J).
Replacing  o  =  0  in  the  0  coefficients  of  equation  (6)  yields  the
following  investment  rule:
iPt  c  tl
=  - +  Y.,f/J)  +  0,.:.KGt_-  +  0tf:.()  (8)
KPt  w  --15
with:
I  13
0s =KI),¢F  - :'1  O  9  SF  Ow  =%  - <  C)
,a+fl  -4  a+  f.1 
and  structural  parameters  a,  1 and  T  given  by:
a  =  - ,  13  =  - - . T  =  - I
In  this  case,  no  restrictions  are  required  on  the  returns  to
scale  a+P.
According  to  equation  (8X,  if  the  firm  faces  a sales
constraint,  its  investment  rate  is  a decreasing  function  of  the
growth  of  the  country's  infrastructure  (0F;2  S  0).  This  Keynesian
feature  is  in  sharp  contrast  with  the  results  arising  from  the
market  structures  analyzed  above.  Therefore,  it  can  be  used  in
order  to  check  whether  or  not  the  sales  constraint  is  binding  (a
significantly  positive  estimate  for  01<=  would  suggest  that  actual
v  is  not  null).
Except  for  the  role  of  the  public  sector's  capital  stock,
equation  (8)  is quite  similar  to  the  Jorgenson's  (1963)
investment  rule.  The  latter,  which  has  been  widely  used  for
empirical  research  in  industrialized  countries,  is  known  as  the
"neoclassical  model".  This  is  because,  unlike  the  "naive"  income
accelerator,  it  takes  relative  factor  prices  into  account.
However,  equation  (8)  is  also  close  to  the  investment  rules
arising  from  fix-price  models  (see,  particularly,  the  analysis
developed  by  Grossman,  1972).16
The  implicit  approach  (Tobin's  q)
Assume  now  that  there  are  significant  investment  costs,  so
that  r  >  o.  Since  the  expected  user  cost  of  capital  cannot  be
calculated  anymore,  the  optimal  investment  rule  will  not  depend
on  c#-,z.  Instead,  consider  the  following  Lagrangian:
1  r  2
=  Ze  +  . (  pe-.-  - wtvw.Lt-.  )  2  vc-KPe-  (  uc  +  .Ue 
1  +  rt  2
ev.Fe  :#  1  +  U.
+  -_KP-  v.Pe  +  v4 .(  KP.  e  - KP,.,
1 +  r  1e-S
with  vf  being  the  multiplier  associated  with  the  motion  law of
the  capital  stock  (equation  (1)).  This  co-state  variable
measures  the  contribution  of  an  additional  capital  unit  to  the
firm's  market  value.  The  control  variables  are  now  ut,  KPt..;. 2 and
L,,.., thus  leading  to  the  following  first-order  conditions:
Ve*
i +  r.ue 
v=.  (I  +
1 
Vew  =  .t  Pe  . f,d: 1 (KG 1 5 KPe  ,LE-- 2.)  +  vft-e 3
1  +
w  ~~~~~~~~~~~wt  b..  ±
f,  (KG,,_  j,,KPe tj  Lf  =  -
Pt-iX
According  to  the  second  equation  above,  the  co-state
variable  gathers  the  discounted  effects  of  a  larger  capital  stock
on  future  current  profits,  but  also  on  the  resale  price  of  the
firm.  Therefore,  vt.  must  be  seen  as  the  shadow  price  of1  7
additional  capital.  The  right-hand  side  of  the  equation  above,
in  turn,  is nothing  but  the  marginal  value  of  the  q  variable
defined  by  Tobin  (1969),  since  it measures  the  ratio  between  the
shadow  price  of  additional  capital  v.-  (here,  adjusted  for
depreciation)  and  its  market  price  vf.
Replacing  the  second  equation  into  the  first  one  leads  to
the  following  investment  rule:
1  +  r.ut  qt  =  (9)
ve,(  1+  6).(I  - r+ )
The  problem  with  equation  (9)  is  that  only  average  q  is
statistically  observable.  Indeed,  the  stock  market  value  of  the
firm  provides  information  on  the  shadow  price  of  already  existing
capital  goods,  i.e.  on  the  sum  of  total  discounted  profits  plus
the  resale  price  of  total  capital.  But  it  does  not  necessarily
provide  information  on  the  shadow  price  of  investments  to  be
done.  This  can  be  seen  by  replacing  the  analytical  expression  of
the  demand  curve  (equation  (3))  and  the  last  first-order
condition  into  the  right-hand  side  of  equation  (9),  which  yields
for  marginal  q:
1  (a-e)/e  -f(o-i-3)+(I-cz-,1l3)Je
q  C.  - .K  f.t.
vt.  (1+6).  (1+r-)
1ii  'r(cr-i/e  le'  -(o-e)/G
* ( Ye  X 1/JJ)  ,  |  c:  Ge  |  X  .Ps  +  .we |  X  +vet-1 3
Marginal  q  is  equal  to  the  statistically  observable  q only
if  the  exponent  of  KP  in  the  equation  above  is  zero.  This  is
what  happens  when  a+>  =  u/(o-l),  i.e.  when  increasing  returns  to
scale  are  exactly  offset  by  the  price  decrease  resLlting  from  a
larger  output.  Of  course,  this  is very  unlikely  to  happen.18
However,  the  assumption  o+-3  =  l/(a-l)  has  been  waidely  used  in
literature,  in  the  hypothesis  of  perfect  competition  irn  the  goods
market  (a  ->  sz-%.  In  this  case,  the  required  restriction  on  the
production  function  parameters  is ?Y+3  =  1 (Hayashi,  1962).P
For  a capital  stock  WP,  average  q can  be  written,  by
definition,  as:
KP
q=(KP)  =  |  (I/KP).q_k).dk
with  the  line  over  q  indicating  average.  Replacing  above  the
analytical  expression  of  marginal  qt  yields:
_  ~~(ca+O  + (I--).  p 
q1e  =  qe  +
(a-l)(l+S)vj.(l+rft).KPft.
It  is  worth  noting  that  this  result  does  not  hold  when  a  =
0,  i.e.  when  the  firm  faces  quantity  rationing  in  the  goods
market.  Indeed,  for  any  given  price  p.-±x =  Pt.,  there  exists  a
capital  stock  KPm such  that  the  firm  would  not  face  a  sales
constraint  anymore  if  KP were  lower  than  KPm.  Hence,  in  order  to
discuss  the  case  a =  0,  a  more  complicated  relationship  between
average  and  marginal  q must  be  considered,  in  which  the  relevant
demand  curve  is  different  depending  on  whether  KP  is  lower  or
higher  than  KPm (Precious,  1985).
In equilibrium,  all  firms  set  the  same  price,  since  they  all
face  the  same  optimization  problem.  Hence,  pf.- 1 =  Pz  and  Q_l
=  Yf1 /J.  By  replacing  into  the  analytical  expression  of  average
q,  equation  (9)  leads  to  the  following  investment  rule:
9/  If  u  =  0,  on  the  contrary,  it  is straightforward  to  verify
that  marginal  q  is  a decreasing  function  of  KP  (Blanchard
and  Sachs,  1982).19
=  01.  r.(qt.  - 1)  +  (10)
KP,
with:
Y  *  |  1  =  *  0=o  =  i/Jr  >  C  *  0  o  =
Coefficient  07-r is  positive  when  a+R  >  c/'-1),  i.e.  when
increasing  returns  to  scale  mcre  than  offset  the  decrease  in
prices  resulting  from  a  larger  output.  Unfortunately,  r  is  the
only  structural  parameter  of  the  model  that  can  be  drawn  from  the
0 coeffcients  in  equation  (10).
The  investment  rule  represented  by  equation  (10)  is  similar
to  the  one  discussed  by  Sc  iantarelli  and  Georgoutsos  (1990).  In
both  cases,  the  empirical  e-quation  bridges  the  gap  between  the
statistically  observable  average  q  and  the  relevant  marginal  q  by
means  of  a variable  or  a set  of  variables  related  to  the  business
cycle.  Indeed,  the  ratio  Yo.  can  be  seen  as  an  indicator  of  the
discounted  average  productivity  of  capital  (in  value  terms).  In
the  case  of  a fixed  coefficients  technology  (3 =  0),  i'
represents  a proxy  for  capacity  utilization  (Licandro,  1990).
So,  the  inclusion  of  yf 1 in  the  investment  rule  provides  a
rationale  for  a current  practice  in empirical  Tobin's  q  studies
for  industrialized  countries  (see  for  instance:  von  Furstenberg,
1977;  Malkiel,  von  Furstenberg  and  Watson,  1979;  and  Chan-Lee  and
Torres,  1987).20
Credit  rationing
When  the  firm  faces  credit  rationing,  the  constraint
represented  by  equation  (4)  is  binding.  This  equation  can  be
rewritten  as  a  polynomial  of  degree  two  in  u.:
r  2  P  F
-. U  +  u-  = 
2  wv  KP&
with  the  only  positive  root  given  by:
I  I  P  F  1/2
ut  =  - - +  -. ( 1  +  2r.  X
r  r  v%.KPft
Taking  a  second-order  Taylor  development  around  Fe  =  0,  the
following  investment  rule  is obtained:
IP,  P,.F,  P..F,  2
-=  - +  >FE  . (,  )  =  r  (11'I
KPt  v:.KP.  'Vf'KP,
The  second  term  in  the  right-hand  side  of  equation  (11)  is
approximately  zero  when  investment  costs  are  not  large,  but
strictly  negative  otherwise.  Notice  that  no  restriction  is
required  on  the  parameters  of  the  model.  But  as  in  the  implicit
approach,  the  latter  cannot  be  directly  drawn  from  the
coefficients  of  the  reduced  form.
Equations  like  (11)  are  used  in  industrialized  countries  to
account  for  the  adjustment  process  towards  the  optimal  capital
stock.  The  idea  is  that  fundamentals  of  the  investment  decision
are  aggregate  demand  and  factor  prices,  whereas  financial
conditions  have  an  incidence  on  the  speed  at  which  investment  can
be  undertaken  (for  example,  Gardner  and  Sheldon,  1975).
Consequently,  there  should  be  a  positive  coefficient  for21
contemporary  F.  values,  but  negative  coefficients  for  lagged  Fe
values,  and  credit  rationing  would  not  modify  the  investment
level  in  the  long  run.  But  this  would  not  necessarily  be  the
case  in LDCs,  if  financial  repression  actually  represented  a  long
lasting  obstacle  for  capital  accumulation.
Foreign  exchange  shortage
Finally,  the  firm  can  be  rationed  by  foreign  exchange
availability.  Provided  that  a  given  share  4) of  total  investment
must  be  imported,  such  a  rationirng  sets  the  upper  limit  for
machinery  and  equipment  purchases.  Hence,  equation  (5)  is
binding,  and  gives  rise  to  the  following  investment  rule:
IPtX  A%
- =  0x-.- - ox.  =  1/4)  (12)
KP v  v  ._KP t
Once  again,  the  main  structural  parameters  of  the  model  cannot  be
drawn  from  this  equation.
4.  MAIN  EMPIRICAL  FINDINGS
The  discussion  above  shows  that  there  are  many  competing
specifications  for  the  investment  function  depending  on  the
values  of  some  key  parameters  of  the  economy,  and  on  whether  or
not  some  quantity  constraints  are  binding.  Now,  the  empirical
performance  of  such  equations  must  be  considered.22
From  theory  to  estimation
Chart  I summarizes  the  relationship  between  the  theoretical
rnodels discussed  abo've and  the  restrictions  on  the  optimization
problem  of  the  representative  firm.  Each  of  the  models  is
identified  with  a capital  letter:  from  R  for  nmonopolistic
competition  wjithout  investment  costs  to  X  for  foreign  exchange
shortage.  These  letters  are  the  same  as  in  the  0  coefficients  of
the  corresponding  investmrent  rules,  represented  by equations  (6),
(7),  (8),  (10),  (11)  and  (12).
(Insert  Chart  1)
The  six  theoretical  models  combine  in different  ways  nine
exogenous  variables.  Each  of  them  is  identified  by  a number,
ranging  from  I  (for  the  growth  rate  of  demand)  to  9  (for- foreign
exchange  availability).  Notice  that  these  are  the  numbers
associated  with  the  0  coefficients  in  the  six  investment  rules.
For  instance,  the  coefficient  multiplying  the  growth  rate  of
infrastructure  is oF"= in  the  monopolistic  competition  model,  0=
in  the  neoclassical  model  and  .:= in  the  Keynesian  model.
The  theoretical  investment  rules  are  not  used  in  their  pure
form  for  the  empirical  task.  a  first  set  of  adjustments  concerns
time  lags.L'n  For  instance,  "time  to  build"  has  to  be  taken  into
account.  Indeed,  the  theoretical  models  explain  the  decision  to
invest,  whereas  the  data  measure  actual  investment.  The  lag
between  both,  which  may  be  different  from  one  investment  project
to  another,  arises  because  of  delays  required  to choose,  buy,
receive  and  install  new  capital  goods.  Therefore,  aggregate
IP=/KP-  should  be  related  not  only  to  the  current  values  of  the
1O/  Although  the  model  considered  just  two  periods  ("present"
and  "future"),  one  can  proceed  as  if  both  of  them  included
many  years  or quarters  (say,  t,  t-1,  t-2,  ...  and  t+1,  t+2,
...  respectively).23
exogenous  variables  but  also  to  their  lagged  values.  An
additional  "timing"  problem  with  the  inviestment  rules  discussed
above  concerns  private  expectations,  which  are  not  statistically
observable.  This  is  why  variables  such  as  Ye ,XL  KGa&tl,
w+J/P*2,  etc.  are  replaced  by distributed-lag  functions
relating  their  future  level  to  their  current  and  past  values.
When  time  lags  are  considered,  the  six  investment  equations
can  be  rewritten  as  in Chart  I.LL  In  the  latter,  each  of  the  ¢,
coefficients  is replaced  by  ~D(L),  wiith L  being  an  operator  such
as Lx_  =x  and  't(L) representing  a  polynomial  expression  of
degree  k in L.  It  follows  that  0(L).x.e  is equal  tc a.7..t  +
Y  4-t-  . . . a-,'  -.  The  long-term  coefficient  of x+-,  in
turn,  is  the  sum  of  the  effects  arising  from  x',  X.,.  v
that  is:  a.7  +  a,  +  . ..  +  a,.  or,  in a  more  compact  notation,  ,(1).
Such  a  long-term  coefficient  should  be  equal  to  the  0.  coefficient
of  the  theoretical  model.  This  is stated  in  the  last  column  of
Chart  1.
A  second  type  of  adjustment  arises  from  aggregation.  Each
of  the  six  investment  equations  is derived  from  the  optimization
problem  of  a single  firm.  However,  it  is  intuitively  clear  that
they  can  be  combined  in order  to  get  mixed  investment  equations
at  the  macroeconomic  level.  For  instance,  it  could  be  assumed
that  a  fraction  p of  the  firms  does  not  face  quantity  rationing,
either  in  the  financial  market  or  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.
The  investment  rate  uL  of  these  firms  would  therefore  result  from
the  theoretical  models  R,  N,  K or  T depending  on  the  values  of
parameters  r  and  a  (say  ut  = u  with  i =  R,  N,  K or  T).  it
could  also  be  assumed  that  for  a  fraction  f?  of  the  firms,  the
investment  rate  is  bounded  by  credit  availability  (ut  =  uF<).
Finally,  in  the  remaining  firms,  the  foreign  exchange  shortage
11/  For  simplicity,  in  Chart  I  the  number  of  firms  (J)  is
treated  as  given.24
would  be  the  binding  constraint  Wue =  ue).  Hence,  the
macroeconomic  investment  equation  would  be:
U  t  =  p.u  l#  +  Q . UF  +  (1-p-Q).u.f  (13)
with  the  analytical  expressions  of  u±.,  uF  and  u-xt  given  by
Chart  1,  and  with  p  and  Q  set  equal  to either  0 or  I based  on
prior  info;-mation.
The  coefficients  in  equation  (13)  can  be  written  as  p.0±
(with  i =  R,  N,  K  or  T).  Q.o,  and  (1-k-fi).0x,  with  the  same
analytical  expression  for  0.^,  op  and  0o  as  in  Chart  1.  In models
R,  N  and  K,  the  structural  parameters  a,  P,  T  and  u  could  be
drawn  from  the  0  coefficients.  This  was  also  true  for  parameter
A  in  both  the  T and  F  models,  and  for  parameter  4'  in  the  X model.
But  in equation  (13),  the  number  of  structural  parameters  is
higher  than  the  number  of  coefficients.  Therefore,  this  second
type  of  adjustmsnt  to  the  theoretical  rules  iinplies a significant
loss  of  ir.formation  on  the  key  features  of  the  economy.
Finally,  the  third  type  of  adjustment  represents  an  ad-hoc
attempt  to  take  into  account  the  economic  instability
characterizing  most  LDCs.  Often,  an  additional  variable  is
included  in  the  chosen  specification,  in order  to  measure  the
variance  of  some  relevant  macroeconomic  aggregate,  such  as  total
output,  returns  on  financial  assets,  etc..  Since  an  increased
economic  instability  should  depress  private  investment,  the
expected  sign  of  the  0  coefficient  associated  with  this  tenth
variable  would  be  negative  whatever  the  chosen  specification.25
An  overview  of  applied  research
Available  empirical  studies  on  private  inrestment  in  LDCs
are  not  very  numerous.  It  must  be  granted  that  standard
macroeconc,metric  models  havse  been  estimated  in  many  countries  in
order  to  produce  short-run  fo,recasts.  But  their  investment
equations  are  often  specified  in  a  rather  ad-hoc  way.  This  is
why  we  have  preferred  to  survey  a  set  of  twaenty-five  recent
studies  which  do  specifically  deal  with  private  investment
determinants  in  LDCs.'  Their  results  are  presented  in  Chart  2,
whose  first  column  identifies  the  corresponding  authors  and
dates.  Of  course,  this  set  of  studiies  is  far  from  tbeing
exhaustive.  But  since  it  includes  a  large  variety  of
specifications,  countries  and  data  sources,  it  should  provide  a
rather  accurate  picture  of  the  state  of  the  arts.
(Insert  Chart  2)
As  regards  the  countries,  thej  are  indicated  in  the  second
column  of  the  Chart.L2'  A  look  at  the  list  suggests  that  the
sample  has  some  regional  bias:  the  shar-e  of  Latin  American
countries  seems  excessively  high,  wher-eas  just  a  few  African
countries  are  considered.  Such  a  bias  could  arise  from  data
availability.  The  latter  could  also  account  for  the  fact  that
only  two  estimates  are  based  on  microeconomic  information  (see
column  three).  Nevertheless,  the  disaggregation  level  of  the
remaining  studies  is  sometimes  significant.  For  instance,  one  of
them  uses  three-digit  Ievel  information,  whereas  two  others
12/  An  additional  study  by  Lim  (1987)  is  set  aside,  because  it
is  only  incidentally  concerned  with  investment.  and  the
corresponding  empirical  equation  does  not  lead  to
signi  ficant  coefficients.
13/  The  meaning  of  all  the  abbreviations  used  in  Chart  2  (for
countries,  variables  and  econometric  technique)  can  be  found
in  the  Appendix.26
distinguish  betwieen small  and  large  firms.  Concerning  the
frequerncy  of  the  series,  onlv  three  of  the  studies  stand  on
quarterly  informatior.  while  the  others  are  based  on  annual  data.
The  fifth  columr  indicates  the  specification  of  the
investment  equation.  Although  the  theoretical  grounds  provided
by  the  authors  may  be  different  frcom,  those  presented  in  section
7,  in order  to compare  the  results  Chart  2  is only  concerned  with
the  exogenous  *v,ariables  corsidered  in each  case  (I to  9  in  terms
of  the  tt  coefficients,).L  Depending  on  the  studies,  these
variables  are  sometimes  lagged  one  period.  More  frequently,  the
investment  equation  includes  a  partial  adjustment  process  (this
is done  in eleven  cases).
In seven  of  the  studies,  the  chosen  specification
corresponds  to  a  "pure"  model  (R,  N,  K.  T,  F or  X in  terms  of
Chart  1),  the  "pure"  effective  demand  specification  being  the
only  one  which  is  not  represented  in  the  sample.  In  the
remaining  cases,  instead  of  a single  model,  linear  combinations
of  two  or  more  specifications  are  used,  as  in  equation  (13).
Most  of  them  include  an  exogenous  variable  for  credit,  thus
showing  the  wide  acceptance  of  the  F  model  for  LDCs.
The  fit  of  the  estimated  equations,  measured  by  the  adjusted
coefficient  of  determination,  can  be  found  in  the  last  column  of
Chart  2.  Whereas  the  average  coefficient  is quite  low  (less  than
0,7),  there  are  large  differences  between  studies,  ranging  from
0,08  to  0,99q  However,  one  should  be  careful  when  assessing
these  results.  On  the  one  hand,  low  coefficients  are  quite
common  when  using  panel  data,  and  such  is  the  case  for  the  lowest
reported  value.  On  the  other  hand,  some  of  the  best  fits
correspond  to  estimates  in  which  the  endogenous  variable  (fourth
14/  For  instance,  a specification  including  the  income
accelerator  and  relative  factor  prices  is  seen  as  arising
from  model  R,  unless  it  takes  into  account  the  rental-wage
ratio  (model  K)  or  it  omits  aggregate  demand  (model  N).27
column)  is not  scaled.  so  that  a  high  coefficient  of
determination  could  just  reflect  a  spurious  correlation  between
variables  trending  upward  over  time.1"  The  problem  gets  worse
when  a  partial  adjustment  process  is used,  since  the  statistical
adjustment  may  reflect  serial  correlation.
Estimated  coefficients
Columns  six  to  thirteen  in Chart  2 embody  the  exogenous
variables  which  may  have  an  incidence  on  private  investment
decisions  ir LDCs.  The  estimated  sign  of  the  corresponding  0
coefficients  in each  of  the  studies  is  indicated  by  "+"  or  "-"
when  they  are  not  statistically  significant,  and  by  "4+"  or  "--"
when  they  are  significant  at  the  57.  'eel.'6  Since  eighteen  of
the  studies  are  based  on  mixed  investment  rules  (like  equation
(13)),  there  is  almost  no  information  on  the  structural
parameters  of  the  model.  An  attempt  was  made  to  draw  their
values  from  the  0  coefficients  of  the  remaining  seven  studies,
but  the  results  were  rather  discouraging,  so  that  they  wi'l  not
be  discussed.  Instead,  some  regularities  in  the  sign  and
significance  of  the  estimated  coefficients  are  noteworthy.
Aggregate  demand  appears  as  an  important  variable  in  the
explanation  of  private  investment  levels.  Included  in all  but
eight  of  the  studies,  its  coefficient  is  always  positive  and
almost  always  statistically  significant.  This  suggests  that  the
pure  neoclassical  model  (in which  there  is no  income  accelerator)
15/  Notice  that  in  some  cases,  the  endogenous  variable  is  the
whole  investment,  thus  including  government  capital
accumulation.  Studies  dealing  with  public  sector  investment
only  (such  as  those  by  Heller,  1975,  and  Chow,  1985)  were
set  aside.
16/  In Chart  2,  exogenout  variables  are  multiplied  by  -1
whenever  necessary  to  obtain  coefficients  whose  expected
signs  are  the  same  as  in Chart  1.28
may  not  be  appropriate  for  LDCs.  However,  one  should  be  careful
concerning  these  results,  because  of  the  spurious  correlation
problem  which  was  mentioned  above:  if  investment  is not  scaled
(by  the  capital  stock.  for  instance)  aggregate  output  could  just
be  acting  as  a  time  trend.
Concerning  public  investment.  although  most  of  the  studies
.scuss  its  crowding-out  effects,  only  five  of  them  account  for
the  possibility  of  an  externality  on  private  investment.27  The
corresponding  coefficient  has  the  "right"  sign  in  two  cases,  thus
reflecting  a positive  value  of  parameter  a.  In  a third  study  (by
Gupta,  1984).  the  coefficient  is negative  despite  the  fact  that
the  model  is  not  based  on  the  K  specification  (it  does  not
consider  the  rental-wage  ratio  as  an  argument).  The  opposite  is
true  for  the  study  by  Sundararajan  and  Thakur  (1980),  in which
the  empirical  investment  equation  includes  model  K,  but  leads  to
a  positive  coefficient  for  public  investment.  In  both  cases,
this  would  mean  that  infrastructure  development  gives  rise  to  a
negative  externality  ('  <  )l.  which  is  rather  surprising.le  In
fact,  the  results  could  reflect  a wrong  appraisal  of  the  goods
market  structure.
As  regards  relative  factor  prices,  Chart  2  depicts  a more
disappointing  panorama.  Very  often,  they  are  not  even  taken  into
account  in  the  empirical  investment  eqLations.  Besides.,  in most
cases  they  are  not  measured  as  required.  This  is what  happens,
particularly,  with  the  user  cost  of  capital,  which  is  defined  in
the  proper  way  only  in  four  cases.  In  the  remaining  studies,  it
is  replaced  by  a  large  variety  of  proxies,  such  as  the  ex-post
17/  We  do  not  include  among  these  the  study  by  Tun  Wai  and  Wong
(1982),  because  government  capital  accumulation  replaces
aggregate  output,  so  that  it  probably  captures  an  income
accelerator  effect.
18/  We  are  not  speaking  about  crowding  out,  since  the  empirical
investment  equations  used  by  both  Gupta  and  Sundararajan  and
Thakur  take  financial  repression  into  account,  by  including
savings  availability  among  their  arguments.real  interest  rate,  the  actual  or  expected  inflation  rate,  the
relative  price  of  capital  goods,  the  assets-to-liabilities  ratio,
etc..  It must  be  granted  that  the  corresponding  coefficients
have  generally  the  right  sign,  but  usually  they  are  not
statistically  significant.
A  theoretical  reason  that  could  account  for  this  result  is
related  to  the  structure  of  the  goods  market.  Assume  that  the
variety  of  available  goods  is  low  in LDCs,  so  that  goods  are  weak
substitutes.  In  terms  of  the  demand  curve  faced  by  individual
firms  (equation  (31)), the  price-elasticity  u  should  be  lower  (in
absolute  values)  than  in  industt  alized  countries.  Now.
coefficients  q.w- and  ¢4,  which  measure  the  elasticity  of  the
optimal  capital  stock  with  respect  to  the  user  cost  of  capital
and  the  real  wage.  are  lower  (in  absolute  values)  the  lower  a.
Therefore,  the  higher  monopoly  power  enjoyed  by  firms  in LDCs
could  account  for  the  "structuralist"  flavour  of  the  empirical
results  reported  in  Chart  2.
Four  studies  avoid  taking  factor  prices  explicitly  into
account  by  choosing  the  implicit  approach,  either  in  its  pure
form  o.-  combined  with  the  F model.  In all  the  cases,  the
coefficient  of  the  q variable  is  positive  and  highly  significant.
Twro of  the  studies  also  include  a  business-cycle  indicator,  which
"corrects"  the  observable  average  q  and  leads  to  the  (relevant)
marginal  q.  The  corresponding  coefficients  are  positive  and
statistically  significant,  thus  pcinting  out  that  increasing
returns  to  scale  more  than  offset  the  effect  of  a downward-
sloping  demand  curve.  These  results  suggest  that  the  implicit
approach  may  be  a useful  device  in  LDC.s, in spite  of  the  weakness
of  their  capital  markets.
Credit  availability  also  emerges  from  Chart  2  as  one  of  the
decisive  arguments  for  private  investment  in many  LDCs.  Indeed,
financial  variables  are  included  in eighteen  of  the  studies,  and
the  corresponding  coefficients  have  almost  always  the  right  sign30
and  are  generally  significant.  However,  as  was  the  case  for
relative  factor  prices,  financial  variables  are  sometimes
measured  in  quite  misleading  ways.  Particularly,  instead  of
credit  availability  (which  is  related  to  savings,  banking  system
regulations,  etc.),  most  of  the  studies  consa'er  actual  credit,
which  represents  just  the  "short  side"  of  the  financial  market.
In  this  case,  the  estimated  coefficients  do  not  convey
information  on  whether  investment  decisions  are  determined  by
actual  credit,  or  the  opposite.  Therefore,  one  should  be  careful
when  assessing  the  financial  repression  hypothesis  from  the
results  reported  in Chart  2.
Foreign  exchange  availability  is  taken  into  account  in  five
of  the  studies,  by  means  of  a  large  variety  of  statistical
indicators:  exports.  international  reserves,  the  real  exchange
rate,  etc..  The  corresponding  coefficients  have  always  the  right
sign  and  are  almost  significantly  positive.  However,  a rise  in
the  chosen  statistical  indicators  could  be  seen  as  evidence
reflecting  that  domestic  economic  policies  are  sound  and
sustainable.  Expected  profitability  should  therefore  increase,
even  though  aggregate  demand,  current  factor  prices,  etc.
remained  unchanged  in the  short  run.  If  this  were  so,  the  chosen
balance-of-pay/ment  variables  could  be  accounting  for  the
"investment  climate",  and  not  necessarily  for  quantity  rationing.
Finally,  six  studies  include  additional  indicators  for
economic  instability.  In some  cases,  these  are  dummy  variables,
reflecting  economic  policy  changes  or  uncertainties.  Other
studies  measure  instability  through  the  standard  deviations  of
either  relative  prices,  aggregate  output,  or  stock  market  yields.
In all  the  cases,  the  corresponding  coefficients  have  the
expected  sign  and  are  statistically  significant.3'
5.  DEALING  WITH  ECONOMIC  INSTABILITY
The  results  reported  in chart  2 provide  some  support  to  the
theoretical  arguments  discussed  in Sections  2 and  3,  concerning
the  determinants  of  private  investment  in LDCs.  The  estimated
coefficiernts,  particularly,  have  often  the  right  sign  and  are
generally  significant.  But  the  fit  of  the  equations  is not  fully
satisfactory,  despite  the  scaling  and  autocorrelation  problems
mentioned  above.  This  could  be  due  to  the  aggregation  criteria
used  to  get  a  single  equation  from  a  large  number  of  investment
rules.  Indeed,  aggregation  raises  specific  problems  in a context
of  economic  instability  like  the  one  characterizing  most  LDCs.
The  most  general  specification  (equation  (13))  was  obtained
by  assuming  that  a  share  p  of  the  firms  did  not  face  quantity
ratiorning,  whereas  for  shares  ( and  I-p-Q  investment  was
determired  by  credit  and  foreign  exchange  availability
respectively.  Parameters  p  and  (l  could  be  set  equal  to  zero  or
one  based  on  prior  information,  but  they  were  constant  for  the
whole  studied  period.  However,  it  is  intuitively  clear  that  p
and  Q  could  rise  or  fall  significantly  if  the  economic  policy
were  sharply  modified.  For  exaample7 monetary  tightness  should
increase  the  share  of  firm.s which  face  credit  rationing,  while
the  adoption  of  exchange  rate  controls  should  increase  the  share
of  firms  constrained  by  available  foreign  currency.  In  this
section,  a  rigorous  aggregation  procedure  is  chosen  to deal  with
these  changes.
The  theoretical  analysis  presented  in  section  3  holds  at  the
level  of  any  single  firm  j,  with  j =  1,  2,  ... ,  J.  So.  the
firm's  investment  rate  is  ,  =  (ul)_,  with  i =  R,  N,  K or  T  if
no  quantity  constraint  is  binding.  If,  on  the  contrary,  firm  j
is  rationed  in  the  credit  market,  its  investment  rate  is u,t  =32
(UF=)j.  Finally,  uJ,  =  (uw)jt  if firm  j  faces  a  foreign exchange
shortage.L'  This  can  be  written  as:
- llin (  (u  L)J  ,  (U,J  (u:  (14)
The  investment  rates  (uL)..,  (uF.)  and  (u 4) 1 J  will
generally  differ  from  one  firm  to  another,  depending  on  their
capital  stock,  their  access  to  financial  resources  and  foreign
currency,  etc,.  such  a heterogeneity  is captured  by  the
following  multiplicati'ie  model:
(UL)j*t  =  Uti .SiJ  ,  ( UF  1 j  - SFu=.s5j  ,  (ux)j+  =  ux.sxj  (15)
In equation  (15),  u,  uFt  and  uxz  are  aggregate  investment
functions  like  those  considered  in Chart  1.  Hence.  they  only
depend  on  macroeconomic  variables,  like  aggregate  demand,  average
factor  prices,  etc.  (this  is  why  the  "j"  index  is set  aside).
Concerning  s±,,  sf=  and  s,x,  they  represent  positive  disturbances
which  differ  from  one  firm  to  another,  but  do  not  change  over
time  (therefore.  the  "t"  index  can  be  omitted).  Depending  on
their  specific  disturbances.  some  firms  will  be  able  to  attain
their  desired  investment  rates,  whereas  others  will  be
constrained  either  by  credit  or  by  foreign  exchange.
Assume  that  sL,  s5  and  sx  can  be  treated  as  independent
stochastic  variables,  and  let  h±(s),  h,(s)  and  hd(s)  be  their
corresponding  density  functic.ns.  In  this  case,  the  aggregate
investment  rate  1s  given  by  the  following  mean  of  equations  (14):
19/  Models  F  and  X do  not  entail  restrictions  on  the  structural
parameters  of  the  model  (see  Chart  1).  Therefore,  they  are
both  compatible  with  any  of  the  four  other  specifications
(R,  N,  K  or  T).33
Ut  =  J  j  |  snhujtsij,thj,L(sxdsjds  dsx
Qi  O C)
If,  in addition,  hL(s),  h,(s)  and  h<(s)  can  be  approximated  by
the  same  Weibull  law  with  unit  mean,  it  can  be  shown  that  the
equation  above  becomes:
-ni  -1/T
u=  [  ut  +  uF.t  +  uxpt  3  (16)
(see  Gouri&eroux,  Laffont  and  Monfort,  1984,  p.2 8).
In equation  (16).  the  n parameter  (n  >  0)  arises  from  the
Weibull  law,  and  is  higher  the  lower  the  variance  of  disturbances
s±,  sp.  and  sx.  Notice  that  for  n ->  +a,  the  right-hand  side  of
equation  (16)  becomes  a minimum  condition.  In economic  terms.
the  variance  of  the  s:.  sF  and  sx  disturbances  is  zero,  so  that
for  given  levels  of  u&,  u,  and  u,.  all  the  firms  are  in  the
same  situation.  Consequently,  there  are  no  aggregation  problems,
and  the  investment  rate  for  the  whole  economy  is  just  the  lowest
of  three  different  rates  arisinq  from  competing  specifications,
which  can  all  three  be  expressed  in  the  same  way  as  for  a  single
representative  firm. 24  @
Equation  (16)  is  close  to  the  investment  rule  developed  by
Lambert  (1986).  In  his  model,  the  optimal  capital  stock  could  be
explained  by  two  competing  specifications,  while  an  error
correction  mechanism  led  to  the  investment  equation  to  be
estimated.  However,  the  Lambert  model  was  only  concerned  with
shortages  in  the  goods  market  (in  terms  of  section  3,  the
competing  specifications  would  be  models  K  and  N).  Equation
20/  This  leads  to  a  specific  econometric  problem,  since  there  is
no  information  on  whether  an  observation  ue  arises  from  the
u±t  model,  from  the  uF_  model  or  from  the  uxt  model.  Quandt
(1988)  provides  useful  tools  to deal  with  such  a problem.34
(16).  on  the  contrar*,,  allows  for  a wider  range  of  constraints  on
the  firms  optimization  problem.
Equation  (16)  is  also  close  to  the  kind  of  weighted  average
represented  by  equation  (13),  on  which  stood  most  of  the  applied
research  discussed  in sectionr  4.  However 4 there  are  two
important  differences  between  these  two  specifications.  First  of
all.  in  equation  (16)  parameter  n  is  estimated  simultaneously
with  the  si  ccefficients  in  ut  , uF-  and  Ut  . Since  the  values  of
the  structural  parameters  of  the  model  are  to  be  drawn  from  these
coefficients,  equation  (16)  avoids  the  loss  of  information  which
c  haracterized  equation  ( 137)  .
The  second  difference  concerns  the  p  share  of  non-
constrained  firms  and  the  Q  share  of  firms  facing  quantity
rationing.  In equation  (13)  these  shares  were  constant.  In
equation  (16),  on  the  contrary,  they  both  change  over  time,  their
optimal  estimates  for  period  t being:
it  u,.  t  F 
t-tt  =  [  3  3  gt  =  [  - 3  (17)
with  u,l  representing  the  forecast  of  the  aggregate  investment
rate  (see  Sneessens  and  Dreze.  1986).  Once  the  parameter  it  and
the  ¢ coefficients  in  Ut-  UF_  and  ux_  have  been  estimated,  these
shares  can  be  easily  calculated.  Therefore,  equation  (16)  allows
a  more  accurate  analysis  of  private  investment  determinants.  For
example,  there  could  be  a depressed  investment  rate  in  some
periods  because  of  generalized  credit  rationing  (i.e.  because  of
a  low  UFl_1  while  in  some  other  periods  the  same  outcome  could
arise  from  low  profitability  (low  u±t).  Such  shifts  are  not
observable  when  using  equation  (13)  for  empirical  research.
As  a result,  equation  (16)  allows  to  analyze  the  changing
effects  of  economic  policy  measures  depending  on  the  current35
situation.  For  instance,  when  an  important  share  of  the  firms
face  credit  rationing  ((1  large),  a higher  public  investment
could  lead  to a  significant  crowding-out  of  private  investment.
On  the  contrary,  when  private  investment  is  low  because  of  a
depressed  profitability  (p.  large),  the  development  of  the
country's  infrastructure  would  have  a positive  impact,  because  it
imposes  an  externality  on  private  profits.
6.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
The  determinants  of  private  investment  decisions  in LDCs  are
not  necessarily  the  same  as  in  industrialized  countries.  The
discussion  above  points  out  that  there  are  specific  issues,
arising  from  a different  macroeconomic  and  institutional  setting,
such  as  financial  repression,  foreign  exchange  shortage,  lack  of
infrastructure  and  a  sigrnificant  economic  instability.  The
available  empirical  studies,  in  turn,  provide  some  support  to
these  arguments.  Hence,  their  careful  introduction  into  the
theoretical  models  from  which  investment  equations  are  drawn
would  deserve  further  research.  This  is  the  case,  particularly,
with  the  intertemporal  dimension  of  the  analysis,  restrained  in
this  paper  to  a  simple  two-period  frame-work.
With  a  few  exceptions,  the  available  empirical  studies
cannot  be  considered  fully  satisfactory.  T.ie  encdogenous  variable
is seldom  scaled,  as  would  require  the  theoretical  models,  so
that  it  probably  gathers  a  time  trend.  Moreover,  some  key
exogenous  variables,  such  as  the  user  cost  of  capital,  are
measured  in misleading  ways.  This  is also  the  case  with  the
upper  bounds  on  credit  and  foreign  exchange  availability,  which
define  two  quantity  constraints  particularly  relevant  in LDCs.
This  measurement  issue  would  also  deserve  further  research.36
Finally,  the  paper  stresses  the  importance  of  the
aggregation  procedure  in  the  context  of  a significant  economic
instability.  Sudden  and  dramatic  policy  changes  put  forward  the
Lucas  critique,  since  they  modify  the  relevant  investment  rule.
By  raisirg  or  decreasing  the  share  of  firms  which  face  credit  or
for-eign exchange  rationing,  these  changes  avoid  using  a
representative  firm  approach.  The  paper  includes  a
methodological  proposal  to deal  with  this  problem.  Applied
research  would  help  deciding  whether  or  not  the  suggested
procedure  improves  the  econometric  performance  of  empirical
investment  equations  in LDCs.37
Appendix
LIST  OF  ABBREVIATIONS
Variables
IP  Gross  private  investment  (in  real  terms)
IG  Gross  investment  of  the  public  sector  (in  real  terms)
Y  Real  aggregate  output
yP  Private  sector's  real  output
'.*w  Potential  output  or  time  trend  of  actual  output
y  Discounted  average  productivity  of  capital  (in value
terms)
KP  Private  capital  stock
KG  Public  sector's  capital  stock
F  Financial  resources  available  for  the  private  sector
(in  real  terms)
A  Foreign  currency  available  for  the  private  sector
P  General  price  index
P-t  Expected  price  index
w  Nominal  wages
v  Nominal  market  price  of  capital  goods
r  Discount  rate  (or  nominal  interest  rate)
x  Nominal  exchange  rate
c  Nominal  user  cost  of  capital
q  Ratio  between  the  shadow  price  of  capital  and  its
replacement  cost
Estimates
VAR.:  Exogenouts  variable
COEF.:  +  (or  -)  Positive  (or  negative)  coefficient.  Not
significant  at  the  5%C level.
COEF.:  ++  (or  --1  Positive  (or  negative)  coefficient.
Significant  at  the  5-  level.38
Econometric  technique
OLS  Ordinary  least  squares
2SLS  Two-stage  least  squares
3JLS  Three-stage  least  squares
ML  Maximum  likelihood
FIML  Full-information  maximum  likelihood
AR  Autoregressive
IV  Instrumental  variables
Countries
Kor  Republic  of  Korea
Arg  Argentina  Meial  Mlalaysia
Bar  Barbados  Mex  Mexico
Bol  Bolivia  Mor  Morocco
Bra  Brazil  Nic  iMlicaragua
Chi  Chile  Pak  Pakistan
Col  Colombia  Pan  Panama
Cos  Costa  Rica  Pa.-  Paraguay
Dom  Dominican  Republic  Per  Peru
Ecu  Ecuador  Phi  Philippines
Eth  Ethiopia  Sal  El  Salvador
Gha  Ghana  Sir  Singapore
Gre  Greece  Sri  Sri  Lanka
Gua  Guatemala  Tai  Taiwan
Cluy  Guyana  T&T  Trinidad  and  Tobago
Hai  Haiti  Tha  T,.ailand
Hon  i-onduras  Tur  Turkey
Ind  India  Uru  Uruguay
Ins  Indonesia  V*en  Venezuela
Jam  Jamaica  Zim  Zimbabwe37
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